


EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Routing Slip

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X (w/att)		
2	DDCI		X "		
3	EXDIR		X "		
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11	IG				
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13	D/EE0				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/OEA				
16	C/PAD/OEA				
17	SA/IA				
18	AO/DCI				
19	C/IPD/OIS				
20	ES/NFIB	X (w/att)			
21	ES		X (w/att)		
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SUSPENSE 18 May
Date

Remarks:



7 May 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Walter Elder
Executive Secretary
National Foreign Intelligence Board

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Donovan Award Dinner - 22 May 1982

1. Can you suggest some remarks on the occasion of the presentation of the Donovan Award to John McCone.

2. Pull out of your history what you consider his most significant achievements as DCI. Also, whatever would be relevant and significant about his pre-CIA activities, i.e., Atomic Energy Commission, the Air Force, shipping and construction contributions to the conduct of World War II and his interest in security and intelligence matters since 1965.

3. I will want to say something about his assessments and advice on Vietnam in which I understand his position was that it was wrong to send troops out to fight a war without supporting them more fully by the air power which we had to deploy. I would intend to do something on his estimates on Cuban missiles. Remarks I made previously on that are attached.

4. Finally, I would like to say something about his conception of the national estimate as the major responsibility of a DCI, how they were developed under his direction, and his general approach to the job. I remember that General Kenneth Strong in his book, "Intelligence at the Top", had quite a bit to say about this in supporting his estimate that McCone was the best of the foreign intelligence officers he had occasion to work with.

C
William J. Casey

Attachment

L-206
xf L-204

Again in 1962, John McCone, newly arrived as Director of Central Intelligence, learned that Soviet anti-aircraft weapons had arrived in Cuba. What are they there to protect, he wondered, not sugar plantations or rum mills. There are no targets there now, he concluded, so they must intend to bring something there which will need to be attacked and hence will need to be defended. Thus, he was many months ahead of anyone in Washington in predicting that Moscow might base offensive missiles in Cuba. When Cuban refugees brought reports that large missiles were being landed in and installed in Cuba, everyone else in Washington dismissed them. They could not be offensive weapons. The Soviets would never do anything so foolish. McCone's break with the conventional wisdom was vindicated when a U-2 airplane returned with pictures of Soviet missiles in Cuba which could not be denied.